Regulating the Environmental Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler by Pendorf, Stephan
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 6
Winter 1985
Regulating the Environmental Release of
Genetically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Heckler
Stephan Pendorf
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephan Pendorf, Regulating the Environmental Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 891 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol12/iss4/6
REGULATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS: FOUNDATION
ON ECONOMIC TRENDS V. HECKLER*
STEPHAN PENDORF
I. INTRODUCTION
Recombinant DNA technology, commonly referred to as genetic
engineering,' has revolutionized scientific thinking.' Scientists now
have the ability to remove a fragment of the genetic material from
one organism and "splice" it into an unrelated organism. By
"recombining" the genetic material of two different species, scien-
tists can create new life forms in the laboratory which would never
occur in nature. This technology has been successfully employed in
industry to genetically reprogram micro-organisms to "ferment"
scarce complex organic molecules such as human insulin or in-
terferons.3 Scientists are also developing ways to correct genetic
defects in humans by "splicing in" functional genes to take the
place of defective genes.4 "Genetic surgery" differs from conven-
tional treatment of genetic defects in that the genetic cure is
inheritable.
This revolutionary technology challenges traditional social, polit-
ical, and religious concepts. Basic constitutional principles, such as
individual autonomy, equal rights, separation of church and state,
even the meaning of being human and of family lineage, are being
challenged. Religious groups have reacted strongly, questioning the
propriety of developing techniques which may lead to an attempt
to "enhance" and "perfect" human beings. Scientists are accused
of "playing God," opening a Pandora's box of mischief and harm.'
* The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Dr. Stanley Barban,
Administrative Scientist, National Institutes of Health, and Mr. Edward Lee Rogers,
Attorney, Washington, D.C.
1. Genetic engineering refers to the manipulation of hereditary characteristics through
direct interaction with the genetic material, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), rather than
through natural selection or breeding.
2. Abelson, A Revolution in Biology, 209 SCIENCE 1319 (1980).
3. Heitzman, Leung, Perry, Kohr, Levine & Goeddel, Secretion of Human Interferons
by Yeast, 219 SCIENCE 620 (1983); Johnson, Human Insulin from Recombinant DNA Tech-
nology, 219 SCIENCE 632, 633 (1980); Pestka, The Purification and Manufacture of Human
Interferons, Sc. AM., Sept. 1981, at 37.
4. Kolata, Gene Therapy Method Shows Promise, 223 SCIENCE 1376 (1984).
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEER-
ING WITH HUMAN BEINGS (Nov. 1982) (cover letter from Chairman) [hereinafter cited as
SPLICING LIFE].
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Until now, all work involving recombinant DNA has been per-
formed in laboratory or industrial containment facilities.' Scien-
tists, attracted by the commercial potential of finding cheaper and
more efficient ways to manage environmental resources, are begin-
ning to use recombinant DNA techniques to develop organisms for
deliberate release into the environment. Naturally occurring orga-
nisms have evolved specific characteristics to serve their own pur-
poses: survival and reproduction. Scientists have begun applying
recombinant DNA techniques to "reprogram" these organisms to
serve man. These new organisms can perform specific commercially
useful tasks upon release into the environment.
On May 16, 1984, Judge John Sirica of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia stunned the administration
of the National Institutes of Health and the scientific community
at large. He ordered an injunction halting what was to have been
the first-ever intentional environmental release of organisms genet-
ically engineered through recombinant DNA techniques. 7 The
halted experiment would have released genetically engineered bac-
teria onto a field of potato plants in California in an attempt to
biologically control frost damage in frost sensitive plants. The agri-
cultural industry suffers from $1-3 billion in frost damage to frost
sensitive crops annually.'
The success of this experiment could have been a boon to Flor-
ida citrus growers who suffered from severe freezes in 1977, 1981,
1982, 1983, and 1985.1 The Christmas freeze of 1983 alone caused
$1.1 billion in frost damage.10 Florida Commissioner of Agriculture
Doyle Conner wrote after hearing of the Sirica injunction: "While
we all recognize the need to be aware of environmental hazards,
this frost-protection program could be quite important to farmers
everywhere and we would not want legal maneuvers to unnecessa-
rily hamper biotechnological development."1 Conner thought the
creation of the bacterium was one of the promising developments
6. Interview with Dr. Stanley Barban, Administrative Scientist, of the Office of Recom-
binant DNA Activities, National Institutes of Health, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 20, 1984).
See David, Suit filed against NIH, 305 NATURE 262 (1983).
7. Norman, Judge Halts Gene-Splicing Experiment, 224 SCIENCE 962 (1984). See infra
text accompanying note 122.
8. Milewski & Talbot, Proposals Involving Field Testing of Recombinant DNA Contain-
ing Organisms, 6 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 141, 143 (1983).
9. White, Frozen Out: Cold Weather and Imports Killed the Citrus King, FLA. TREND,
Sept. 1984, at 79.
10. Washington Post, July 3, 1984, at E6, col. 4.
11. Conner, Farm Front, FLA. MARKET BULL., July 1, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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of genetic engineering and called those who opposed it "Luddites"
who were challenging the "wave of the future."12
We are about to enter an era in which our ability to manage
environmental resources will be greatly enhanced through the use
of genetically engineered organisms. Such organisms will, for exam-
ple, increase the energy efficiency and thoroughness of oil and min-
eral recovery.1 3 A bacterium has been patented which can "eat" oil
spills"4 and others are being developed to eat other pollutants such
as dioxin.1 5 A bacterium has been developed to fixate nitrogen,
eliminating the need for nitrogen fertilization of agricultural
plants. This bacterium could provide an inexpensive method for
increasing the crop yield of underdeveloped countries."6
"New technologies, especially those as powerful as biotechnol-
ogy, raise completely new questions. Some of the questions are so
unique that they don't come under the rubric of existing laws. '" 17
There is a lack of consensus among Congress, the executive branch,
scientists, local governments, environmentalists, and commercial
biotechnology companies on how, if at all, environmental releases
should be regulated.' 8 This comment will examine the technology,
evaluate the need for federal oversight, and assess the adequacy of
current regulatory mechanisms.
II. RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY
"Biotechnology is nothing new, except for lawyers." Dr. Davies,
of the Swiss biotechnology firm BioGen, began a university lecture
by expressing the perception of biotechnology companies of an in-
formation lag in the legal community.19 Recombinant DNA tech-
12. Id. "The Luddites were the workers who, in the early 19th Century, stood in the way
of sweeping industrialization of the textile industry by the introduction of labor-saving ma-
chines." Id.
13. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS
AND OVERSIGHT, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING 15 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
14. Diamond, Comm'r of Patents & Trademarks v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 15.
16. Id. at 14; see also Valentine, Genetic Engineering in Agriculture with Emphasis on
Biological Nitrogen Fixation, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT DNA 224-31 (1977).
17. Flaherty, A Brave New World for Biotech Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 1984, at 1, col.
3 (quoting Robert B. Nicholas, Chief Counsel and Staff Director of a subcommittee of the
House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology).
18. Perpich, Federal Policies on Environmental Release of Recombinant DNA Contain-
ing Organisms, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, July-Aug. 1984, at 5, col. 5.
19. Lecture by Professor Davies, European Molecular Biology Organization, at Univer-
sity of Bielfeld (Sept. 10, 1983), reprinted in Kircher, Biotechnologie, 18 DIE UMSCHAU 536
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nology is bringing about a revolution in industrial processes, agri-
culture, and health care. The scientific novelty of modifying life
forms is raising complex and equally novel legal problems. In order
to comprehend the profound effect recombinant DNA technology
will have on the future of man and to discuss the issue of regula-
tion in its proper context, it will be useful for the reader to first
develop a basic understanding of the technology.2"
The broad implications of the technology are due to the amazing
uniformity among all life forms on the macromolecular level. All
organisms are composed of a relatively small fraction of the total
possible organic compounds. All organisms use the macromolecule
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as the template for the production of
these organic compounds and as the carrier of information from
one generation to the next.2
The DNA molecule can be visualized as a very long ladder. Each
rung represents one of four possible chemical base pairs. Imagine a
language in which there are only four letters, and in which all
words have exactly three letters. There would be sixty-four possi-
ble words, some of which would make sense, while others would be
unintelligible. The "language" of DNA is structured on sets of
three contiguous chemical base pairs. A triplet of base pairs which
codes for an amino acid is known as a codon."2 There are twenty
possible amino acids and each recognizes its own codon. This cor-
respondence of codons to amino acids is the same in all organisms,
giving rise to the concept of the "universal genetic language." 3
A protein is a linear sequence of amino acids. The sequence of
amino acids for a particular protein is encoded in a corresponding
sequence of codons in a strand of DNA. A sequence of codons
which encodes a protein is called a gene. The magic of the genetic
language occurs when a gene directs a cell's machinery to assemble
some hundreds of amino acids into a linear sequence which in turn
folds upon itself to become a functional protein. The sequence of
amino acids in the protein determines that protein's properties,
(1984).
20. The material in this section is derived largely from two reference publications. The
first, the entire September 1981 Scientific American issue, provides the nonscientist with a
basic understanding of the mechanics and uses of recombinant DNA technology. The other,
entitled Research with Recombinant DNA, is a transcript of a scientific forum convened in
1977.
21. Abelson, Introduction to Recombinant DNA Research, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBI-
NANT DNA, supra note 16, at 4-13.
22. Id. at 7-8.
23. Id. at 8.
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and the set of genes possessed by an organism determines that or-
ganism's characteristics. .2"
The cell's DNA thus determines what products will be con-
structed by the cell's "machinery." Certain naturally occurring sin-
gle cell organisms, while converting raw materials into substances
essential for their own growth and maintenance, happen to pro-
duce substances, such as penicillin, or by-products, such as ethyl
alcohol, which are useful to man. Although man has been taking
advantage of these processes for at least eight thousand years, it
has only been since the turn of the century that geneticists began
applying scientific methods to improve the industrial qualities of
these organisms.25 Improvements were made in one of two ways: by
carefully screening cultures of the organism for random mutants
which may have beneficial characteristics, or by selective breeding
of the most productive organisms over many generations to
"evolve" a commercial grade of organism.2
In 1973 scientists discovered biochemical techniques for remov-
ing a segment of DNA from one organism and inserting it into the
DNA complex of an unrelated organism. These techniques, known
as recombinant DNA techniques, revolutionized classical genetics.
It became possible to directly intervene in the genetic constitution
of an organism rather than to rely on natural selection or domestic
breeding. And because the genetic code is universal it became pos-
sible, in theory at least, to cause the genes from a tomato to be
expressed in a fish.2 7 Since such changes are not surgical, but ge-
netic, this new organism has the ability to reproduce and to pass
its newly acquired characteristics on to subsequent generations.
When recombinant DNA techniques were first reported, scien-
tists thought that the barriers of evolution would tumble and that
man could create any desired organism at will. In the past decade,
however, scientists have learned that genes are not as fungible as
first predicted. Generally, evolutionary barriers inhibiting DNA ex-
pression in foreign species have been found to be much stronger
than originally suspected.
Recombinant DNA techniques involve the use of special en-
zymes, known as restriction endonucleases, which cleave the DNA
at specific sites. Some of these endonucleases produce fragments
24. Hopwood, The Genetic Programming of Industrial Microorganisms, Sc'. AM., Sept.
1981, at 91, 92.
25. Kircher, supra note 19.
26. Id.
27. Abelson, supra note 21, at 8.
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with "sticky ends." Each endonuclease recognizes and cleaves
DNA only at a particular sequence of base pairs specific to that
endonuclease. This sequence of base pairs occurs at random along
a DNA molecule and is more likely than not present in the DNA of
many different organisms. When the DNA of two unrelated orga-
nisms is fractionated with the same endonuclease, the sticky ends
of the fragments will be identical. When the fragments of these
two organisms are mixed, they will join at the sticky ends. Nicks
remaining in the new strand of DNA are sealed with another en-
zyme called a ligase. 28 The resulting DNA molecule contains a pe-
culiar set of genes which cannot be found in any one naturally oc-
curring organism.2 9
Scientific euphoria over the discovery of these techniques dimin-
ished slightly as scientists discovered that is is not sufficient for a
segment of foreign DNA merely to be incorporated into a host or-
ganism's DNA for the introduced DNA to become expressed. In-
tracellular regulation of protein synthesis is very complex. A cell
must be able to synthesize the correct amount of a product, such
as an enzyme, and only when needed. Structural genes, which code
for proteins, are preceded by a promotor segment of DNA and fol-
lowed by terminator sequences. Transcription, where a secondary
template ribonucleic acid (RNA) is made from the primary tem-
plate DNA, will not occur if the foreign gene is not situated inside
the proper regulatory sequences."
Once the DNA is transcribed into RNA it must be "translated"
into amino acid sequences by a ribosome. Even if the foreign DNA
is successfully transcribed, it will not be translated unless the
ribosomal binding site on the foreign RNA is sufficiently recogniza-
ble by the host to permit host ribosomes to attach and begin
translation."1
Genes in higher organisms (eukaryotes) are often split by
noncoding intervening sequences called "introns." Introns lie
within the structural genes and make it impossible to directly
translate the primary RNA transcript into a protein. Introns are
transcribed from the DNA along with coding sequences (exons)
and must first be excised in a splicing process which brings the
gene's exons together to form a "mature" RNA molecule. Only this
mature RNA molecule can be translated into amino acids for the
28. Hopwood, supra note 24, at 98-99.
29. Abelson, supra note 21, at 10.
30. Hopwood, supra note 24, at 101.
31. Id.
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formation of a protein.32 Bacteria lack the enzymes to splice the
introns out of a primary RNA transcript. This prevents most natu-
rally occurring eukaryotic genes from being expressed in bacteria. 3
Bacteria have been modified for commercial purposes to "fer-
ment" human interferons, human insulin, and human growth hor-
mones. The genetic material spliced into the bacteria to induce
manufacture of these complex organic molecules cannot be in the
form of intron-containing human DNA. Instead, artificial DNA se-
quences must first be laboriously constructed without introns4.3
Even when a bacterium has been successfully induced to manufac-
ture a foreign protein, there is a further problem in that bacteria
often digest any foreign protein in their cells. The industrial bacte-
ria may have to be genetically modified to shut down its protein
digesting mechanism."5
Today laboratory recombinant DNA techniques are generally re-
garded as safe. The strong evolutionary barriers preventing expres-
sion of foreign genes provide a natural safety mechanism. Another
natural safety mechanism is the fact that each of an organism's
characteristics usually requires tens or hundreds of genes to be
fully expressed. Continuous field monitoring of a novel organism
for newly acquired mild traits will indicate the development of a
few undesired genes and will permit discontinuation of the use of
that organism before it evolves all the genes necessary to become
fully potent.3
These natural safety mechanisms, taken together with labora-
tory containment procedures, have minimized the risk of con-
ducting recombinant DNA experiments in the laboratory. Today
recombinant DNA techniques are seen as powerful but safe scien-
tific tools.
III. THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GUIDELINES
Scientists today prefer to overlook the incident which initiated
the chain of events leading to the creation of the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines. Stanford researcher and pioneer
of recombinant DNA technology Dr. Paul Berg developed a proto-
type recombinant method in 1971. One experiment he was plan-
32. Id. at 92.
33. Id. at 99.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 101.
36. BUNDESMINISTER FUR FORSCHUNG UND TECHNOLOGIE, CHANCEN UND GEFAHREN DER
GENFORSCHUNG (1980) [hereinafter cited as CHANCEN UND GEFAHREN].
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ning to conduct involved the transfer of DNA from an animal tu-
mor virus to a virus which can infect Escherichia Coli, the
common human intestinal bacteria. When cancer researcher Rob-
ert Polack heard about the proposed experiment he "had a fit" and
advised Berg that if the new virus were to escape from the labora-
tory it might survive in the human intestinal bacteria. This would
expose humans to a tumor-causing DNA which might even result
in an "epidemic of cancer" in humans. After months of soul
searching, Berg decided to defer his experiment. 7
Concern in the scientific and public communities mounted over
the conjectured health and safety risks of recombinant DNA re-
search. In 1973 Dr. Berg chaired a committee of prominent scien-
tists who wrote an open letter to the scientists of the world. The
"Berg letter" was published in the National Academy of Sciences
journal, Science,3" and the English journal, Nature.3 9 The letter
appealed to scientists of the world to voluntarily defer recombi-
nant DNA research involving toxic or highly infectious organisms
until containment guidelines could be established. The letter also
called on the NIH to establish an oversight and advisory commit-
tee for interfacing the technology with governmental and public
interests.
In 1975 the National Academy of Sciences sponsored an interna-
tional conference for genetic scientists at the Asilomar Conference
Center in Pacific Grove, California.4" The scientists who met were
by this time more familiar with recombinant DNA techniques and
worked together to produce guidelines for physical and biological
containment to prevent accidental release of recombinant orga-
nisms into the environment.41
The day after the Asilomar conference ended, the National Insti-
tutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC)
met for the first time. The committee recommended adoption of
the Asilomar guidelines by the NIH. A year later the NIH Guide-
lines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules were
published (NIH Guidelines).42 The NIH Guidelines are applicable
only to research involving recombinant DNA molecules. Recombi-
37. Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A His-
tory of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1978).
38. Letter from Paul Berg, et al. to the Editor, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974).
39. Letter from Paul Berg, et al. to the Editor, 250 NATURE 175 (1974).
40. Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, supra note 37, at 1030.
41. Id. at 1035.
42. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NIH Guidelines].
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nant DNA molecules are defined in the Guidelines as "molecules
which are constructed outside living cells by joining natural or syn-
thetic DNA segments to DNA molecules that can replicate in a
living cell."4 3 Other genetic engineering techniques, such as proto-
plast fusion, radiation, or hybridoma techniques are intracellular
and are not covered.
The Guidelines establish a Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee. Committee members are chosen to provide, collectively, ex-
pertise in scientific, legal, and ethical fields relevant to recombi-
nant DNA technology.44 The Guidelines also establish the Federal
Interagency Advisory Committee on Recombinant DNA Research.
Seventeen federal departments and agencies are currently repre-
sented on the committee. The purpose of the committee is to pro-
vide for communication and exchange of information necessary to
maintain coordination of federal programs and activities relating
to recombinant DNA research."
The NIH is tasked with overseeing federally funded research in
curing diseases and promoting public health. The NIH is heavily
involved in sponsoring research in fundamental concepts of molec-
ular genetics of microorganisms and higher organisms and is the
major federal sponsor of research involving recombinant DNA.
This revolutionary technology is seen as a means of understanding
the genetics of cancer and disease-causing microorganisms. Under-
standing the genetic mechanics of carcinogenic and virulent patho-
genic diseases is the first step towards devising a cure.
The NIH realized that these experiments could be dangerous.
By altering the genetic constitution of highly infectious microorga-
nisms, new organisms would be created possessing novel infectuous
capabilities. The NIH was concerned that newly created highly in-
fectious microorganisms might escape from the laboratory and in-
fect employees or the general public.4" Regulations provided in the
Guidelines are therefore containment oriented; they were created
to insure that recombinant DNA experiments funded by the NIH
would not accidentally contaminate the environment.47
The Guidelines attempt to quantify the biological hazard of ex-
periments by classifying organisms involved in the experiments on
the basis of their hazard to health. The Guidelines assign physical
43. NIH Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,555, 24,557 (1983).
44. Id. at 24,562.
45. Id. at 24,577.
46. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
47. Id. at 28.
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and biological containment procedures commensurate with the risk
involved. There are four levels of physical containment, designated
P-1 through P-4. Special laboratory installations, procedures, and
equipment are prescribed to provide physical barriers to accidental
release of experimental organisms.4 8 The facilities required to fur-
nish the most stringent level of physical containment, P-4, are so
elaborate 49 that only a few P-4 facilities exist in the United States,
and only one exists in Europe.5 0
Biological containment procedures are designed to minimize the
possibility of an experimental organism being carried out of the
laboratory on a friendly host and to minimize the survivability of
an organism once outside the laboratory.51 Strains of experimental
organisms have been produced, for example, which require special
nutritional supplements to survive. These supplements are not
available outside the laboratory, virtually eliminating the chances
of environmental contamination.
The NIH Guidelines apply to all recombinant DNA research
conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives support
for any recombinant DNA research from the NIH.52 Noncompli-
ance with the Guidelines would result in withholding of NIH funds
for the conduct of recombinant DNA research from that
institution.
Compliance with the NIH Guidelines by institutions which do
not receive funds from the NIH, such as commercial biotechnology
companies, is purely voluntary.53 Commercial industrial institu-
tions have thus far been complying with the Guidelines for two
reasons. First, compliance with the only regulatory standards in
existence would tend to mitigate tort liability. Second, the appear-
ance of industrial compliance with federal guidelines would dis-
suade local governments from enacting independent, perhaps
stricter, ordinances regulating recombinant DNA research. 54 There
is currently, however, no federal legal prohibition on any privately
48. NIH Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,555, 24,557 (1983).
49. Id. at 24,571 (app. G-II-D).
50. CHANCEN UND GEFAHREN, supra note 36, at 29-30 (quoting Sir John Kendrew, Direc-
tor-General of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory, Heidelberg, Germany).
51. NIH Guidelines, § II, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,555, 24,557 (1983).
52. Id. § I-C.
53. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 27, commented, however, that "[g]iven the highly
competitive nature of the biotechnology industry, it is not unlikely that some companies
may decide not to request RAC approval out of concern that the approval process could
cause costly delays in testing and marketing their products."
54. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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funded recombinant DNA experiment, even deliberate release
experiments.
The Guidelines as originally published in 197611 contained six
strict prohibitions. One of these was a prohibition on deliberate
release into the environment of recombinant DNA-containing or-
ganisms."6 The Guidelines were first revised and relaxed in 197857
to reflect a growing familiarity with the technology. 8 When scien-
tists became interested in using recombinant techniques to geneti-
cally engineer organisms to perform commercially useful tasks
upon deliberate release into the environment, a concept not con-
templated under the original Guidelines, the NIH moved to legiti-
mize RAC review over this new area by "relaxing" the original
strict prohibition on deliberate release. The 1978 revision of the
Guidelines permitted the Director of NIH to make "exceptions" 59
to the prohibitions contained in the original Guidelines." This re-
vision is the subject of Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heck-
ler."1 In 1983 the NIH further relaxed the Guidelines by establish-
ing conditions under which certain plants containing recombinant
DNA may qualify for RAC authorization for environmental
release. 2
By 1983 the Director of NIH had exercised his power and ap-
proved three applications for waivers of the prohibition on NIH-
funded direct release experiments.6 3 The first experiment involved
field testing of corn plants modified by recombinant DNA tech-
55. NIH Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).
56. Id. § III-A-iv, 41 Fed. Reg. at 27,914-15.
57. NIH Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 60,083 (1978).
58. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare explained the purpose of the first
revisions as follows:
The original Guidelines are being updated in light of NIH's experience operating
under them and in light of our increasing knowledge about the potential risks and
benefits of this research technique. As experience accumulates, we should review
and evaluate the evidence to assure that the restrictions imposed are appropriate
to potential risks-strengthening restrictions where needed, relaxing regulation
where justified.
NIH Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042 (1978).
59. Id. at 33,110.
60. The 1978 amendments retained the prohibition, id. § I-D-4, 43 Fed. Reg. at 33,070,
but included a waiver provision. The NIH further relaxed the Guidelines in 1982 and 1983,
but only the 1978 changes had any substantive effect on the ability of the Director of NIH
to authorize direct releases. NIH Guidelines, §§ III-A-2, IV-E-1-b-(1)-(3), 47 Fed. Reg.
17,180, 17,186-87, 17,191 (1982).
61. No. 83-2714 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 14, 1983).
62. NIH Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548, 24,549 (1983).
63. Milewski & Talbot, supra note 8, at 143.
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niques to induce synthesis of additional amino acids. This new
corn is nutritionally complete and able to provide the entire com-
plement of amino acids essential to humans.6 4 The second experi-
ment proposed to demonstrate that pollen modified by recombi-
nant techniques could confer disease resistance on tomato and
tobacco plants. 5
The third experiment (the Lindow experiment) was proposed by
Doctors Lindow and Panopoulos of the University of California,
Berkley."' The intent of the experiment was to investigate the pos-
sibility of biologically controlling frost damage in frost sensitive
plants.
Lindow proposed to displace the naturally occurring frost induc-
ing bacteria from the surfaces of plants by spraying the area with a
mutant of the bacteria from which he had deleted, through recom-
binant techniques, the gene for the production of the ice nucleat-
ing protein. Lindow's was the first direct release experiment that
was ready to proceed, and thus became the subject of the lawsuit
in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler.
Scientists today feel that recombinant DNA technology is safer
than many other types of research and that the only reason the
NIH Guidelines exist is because the public still mistrusts the tech-
nology. 7 The RAC, in fact, had proposed a revision of the Guide-
lines to make them wholly voluntary in 1981, 8 but received strong
feedback from scientists who wanted the mandatory nature re-
tained for public policy reasons.
The following are selected comments received by the RAC: "The
public is not yet ready for voluntary Guidelines."6 9 "[In an era
when science is suspect in the (public) community, evidence of in-
stitutional review is most important. '70 "Scientists could no longer
argue that they were following a policy of self regulation. '71 "[lit
might lead to more stringent regulation at the local level. '7
64. 46 Fed. Reg. 40,331 (1981). This experiment, though not subject to the injunction
which halted the Lindow experiment, has been voluntarily postponed at least until the sum-
mer of 1985. Budiansky, Rifkin strikes at corn this time, 310 NATURE 3 (1984).
65. 48 Fed. Reg. 16,459 (1983).
66. Id. at 24,549.
67. See SPLICING LIFE, supra note 5, at 2, 14-16 (discussion on the "Frankenstein
factor").
68. 46 Fed. Reg. 59,734 (1981).
69. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,166, 17,168 (1982) (statement of Dr. Mason).
70. Id. at 17,175.
71. Id. at 17,168 (statement of Mr. Mitchell).
72. Id. at 17,167 (statement of Dr. Baltimore).
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Concern was also expressed specifically over deregulation of de-
liberate release. The RAC accepted the recommendations of the
scientists and retained the mandatory provision of the Guide-
lines.73 Today, however, ninety percent of recombinant DNA ex-
periments have either been exempted from the NIH Guidelines or
require only local (Institutional Biosafety Committee) review.74
IV. THE LINDow EXPERIMENT
The experiment proposed by Doctors Lindow and Panopoulos is
simple in theory and profound in application. Lindow and associ-
ates observed that frost sensitive plants grown in bacteria free lab-
oratory chambers were able to tolerate mildly freezing tempera-
tures without actually freezing. The same plants when later
sprayed with a solution containing certain common bacteria and
again exposed to mildly freezing temperatures froze and exhibited
frost damage upon thawing. Lindow deduced that the bacteria,
which normally inhabit the superstructures of plants, are the pro-
moters of frost damage in frost sensitive plants.76
Tropical plants such as Florida's citrus trees, which have not de-
veloped mechanisms for tolerating internal ice formation, are clas-
sified as frost sensitive plants. Frost sensitive plants can tolerate
short periods of mild subfreezing temperatures by supercooling. 7'
Even at freezing temperatures water molecules will not sponta-
neously fall into the symmetrical alignment necessary to initiate
ice crystal formation. Small volumes of pure water can be super-
cooled to minus-forty degrees celsius before ice crystals begin to
form spontaneously. For ice crystals to begin forming at warmer
temperatures, certain catalysts, called ice nucleation centers, are
necessary. 77 Lindow and associates discovered that three common
species of bacteria produce a protein which is perhaps the strong-
73. Id. at 17,170.
74. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 26. Certain microbes which have been routinely used
in laboratory experiments and are known to be safe are listed as categorically exempted
under app. A of the Guidelines. Certain nonweed, harmless plants have been categorically
exempted from prior RAC review under app. L of the Guidelines. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,555,
24,564, 24,580 (1983).
75. Lindow, Arny, Upper & Barcher, The Role of Bacterial Ice Nuclei in Frost Injury to
Sensitive Plants, in PLANT COLD HARDINESS AND FREEZING STRESS (A. Sakai & P. Li ed.
1978).
76. I. TING, PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 186 (1982).
77. Lindow, Methods of Preventing Frost Injury Caused by Epiphytic Ice-Nucleation-
Active Bacteria, 67 PLANT DISEASE 327, 327 (1983).
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est naturally occurring ice nucleus.78 This protein can cause ice
crystal formation at temperatures as warm as minus-one degree
celsius. 79 The protein does this by exhibiting a crystaline surface
very similar to an ice crystal. At freezing temperatures the protein
chemically induces water molecules to align themselves on its sur-
face. Once a "seed" of ice has been formed, it becomes easy for an
ice crystal to grow.
Lindow used these observations to construct a series of experi-
ments. He first sprayed a field of crops with a bactericide to reduce
the bacteria population. He found that this reduced crop damage,
but that even dead bacteria remaining on the plants contained the
ice nucleation protein and could still cause frost damage.8 0
Lindow next used classical mutagenic techniques to create a
point mutated bacterium lacking the ability to produce the ice nu-
cleation protein. He refers to this mutant bacteria, which was simi-
lar to the naturally occurring (INA+) bacteria in all other re-
spects, as "ice-nucleation active minus" (INA-) bacteria. Lindow
attempted to biologically control frost damage in plants by using
the INA- bacteria as a "biological bactericide." Since the INA-
bacteria inhabit the same environmental space and compete for
the same nutrients as the INA+ bacteria, Lindow was able to dis-
place the naturally occurring INA± bacteria by saturating a field
with these INA- mutants before the seasonal population of natural
INA+ bacteria could take hold. By suppressing the natural popu-
lation of ice inducing bacteria, Lindow was able to effectively re-
duce the frost damage.8"
Lindow next created an INA- mutant using recombinant tech-
niques. The recombinant mutant had two commercial advantages
over the classically mutated bacteria. First, recombinant mutations
extend over thousands of base pairs and are permanent, while
classical mutagenic techniques produce point mutations of single
base pairs which tend to revert in nature. Second, recombinant in-
duced DNA mutations are well defined, while classical techniques
produce random "spot" mutations which are not well defined and
78. Id. at 328.
79. Id.
80. Lindow & Connell, Reduction of Frost Injury to Almond by Control of Ice Nuclea-
tion Active Bacteria, 109 J. AM. Soc'Y HORTICULTURAL Sc. 48 (1984).
81. Lindow, Population Dynamics of Epiphytic Ice Nucleation Positive Bacteria on
Frost Sensitive Plants and Frost Control by Means of Antagonistic Bacteria, in PLANT
COLD HARDINESS AND FREEZING STRESS, supra note 75.
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may produce latent defects in organisms modified this way."
Lindow intended to repeat the format of his earlier experiment
substituting the recombinant INA- bacteria for the classical INA-
bacteria. Lindow first had to petition the NIH for a waiver of the
deliberate release prohibition. 3 His petition was discussed during
an open Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee meeting. Ques-
tions over the environmental impact of the experiment were raised
and authorization was deferred. 4 Lindow's second petition was
modified to conform to the concerns raised during the earlier RAC
meeting.8 5 The second petition was unanimously recommended for
approval by the RAC and approved by the Director of NIH.8
6
Before the experiment could proceed it was halted by the federal
court injunction. 7
V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OF OPPONENTS OF THE LINDOW
EXPERIMENT
Opponents of the Lindow experiment find support in Lindow's
own scientific papers on the ecological role of the INA+ bacteria.
Lindow wrote that INA+ bacteria may cause frost damage not
only to frost sensitive plants but also to frost sensitive insects. The
opponents rely on this proposition to argue that eliminating an en-
vironmental control on frost sensitive insects could result in the
undesired proliferation of insect pests.8
Lindow thinks that the INA + bacteria may play a role in atmo-
spheric precipitation.89 The bacteria can be found in the atmo-
82. Letter from Advanced Genetics Sciences, Inc. to Dr. William Gartland, NIH (Mar.
22, 1984) (request for approval of field trials).
83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. "Lindow is required to seek RAC ap-
proval, even though NIH is not funding the work, because the university receives support
from the NIH." Norman, supra note 7, at 963. See 48 Fed. Reg. 24,563 (1983).
84. 48 Fed. Reg. 1,156, 1,158 (1983).
85. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,436, 9,441 (1983); Milewski & Talbot, supra note 8, at 142.
86. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548, 24,549 (1983).
87. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 13, 28, Foundation on Economic Trends v.
Heckler, No. 83-2714 (D.D.C. May 16, 1984).
88. Many insects can supercool to very low temperatures .... However, since most
of these species must supercool to survive, factors that decrease the supercooling
capacity of these insects would reduce their survival .... Analogous to plant frost
survival, the presence of these [ice nucleation-active] bacteria would be detrimen-
tal to survival of frost sensitive insects and possibly beneficial to frost tolerant
insect species.
S. LINDOW, PHYTOPATHOGENIC PROKARYOTES, vol. I, § III, ch. 8, at 24 (Dept. of Plant Pathol-
ogy, Univ. of Cal. 1983) (citation omitted). Removing ice inducing bacteria would result in a
proliferation of frost sensitive insects.
89. Lindow, supra note 77, at 332.
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sphere and are active inducers of ice crystal formation. It follows
that the bacteria may play a role in inducing rain. The opponents
argue that large scale displacement of INA+ bacteria by the intro-
duction of INA- bacteria may interfere with global weather
patterns."0
Lindow believes that INA + bacteria help frost hardy plants sur-
vive. When ice crystals form inside plant cells they cause damage
by mechanically piercing cell walls, and also by absorbing intercel-
lular water which "feeds" the ice crystals as they grow, causing de-
hydration.91 Plants which evolved in areas of freezing weather have
developed mechanisms for tolerating the internal ice.9 ' Lindow
theorizes that the INA + bacteria cause ice crystals to begin form-
ing at warmer subfreezing temperatures, which cause the crystals
to grow more slowly. This permits the frost tolerant plants to ac-
commodate more gradually than if the ice crystals began forming
at very cold temperatures and grew rapidly. Frost sensitive plants,
however, which cannot tolerate internal ice and which supercool to
survive mildly subfreezing temperatures, may be helped by the dis-
placement of the INA+ bacteria. Thus, the opponents argue, the
benefits to frost sensitive agricultural plants might be offset by the
potential harm to frost tolerant plants.9
Lindow preferred to use recombinant INA- mutants for their
greater stability. Classical mutants tend to revert in nature, while
recombinant mutations are permanent. The opponents argue that
if the recombinant mutants are more stable, then the magnitude of
ecological risk would also be greater.9'
The arguments advanced by the opponents rely on the premise
that the INA- bacteria could, ultimately, outcompete the naturally
occurring bacteria and displace it in nature. The NIH and the Re-
gents of the University of California contend that the "prolifera-
tion argument" is not plausible for two reasons. First, it would be
contrary to the accepted principles of evolution. A species is closely
integrated into its environment through natural selection and com-
petition with other species. If the INA± characteristic were not
90. David, supra note 6.
91. I. TING, supra note 76, at 184-85.
92. Id.; S. LINDOW, supra note 88, at 23.
93. S. LINDOW, supra note 88, at 21-22. "Ice nucleating bacteria which may play a signifi-
cant role in frost survival of frost tolerant plants conversely are detrimental to frost sensi-
tive agricultural plants." Id. at 23.
94. Interview with E. Lee Rodgers, counsel for the Foundation on Economic Trends, in
Washington, D.C. (July 2, 1984).
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beneficial to the survival of the species, it would have been dis-
carded long ago. Second, Lindow actually observed in laboratory
environmental simulation chambers that his recombinant mutants
were not able to outcompete the naturally occurring bacteria.2
Although the Lindow experiment is, in all probability, rather
harmless in its experimental stage, its commercial impact could be
significant. Lindow's mutant may not be able to ecologically out
compete its natural counterpart, but if the mutant is commercially
successful it will be propagated indirectly by farmers. Employment
of the organism over an entire agricultural belt may have the same
effect as though the organism were able to outcompete its natural
counterpart.
Future direct release experiments might not be as safe as the
Lindow experiment. If direct release experiments can be analo-
gized to the introduction into the environment of exotic organisms
such as the kudzu weed, the gypsy moth, or the mediterranean
fruit fly, then history prescribes caution. 6
VI. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler
On September 14, 1983, the Foundation on Economic Trends
brought suit against the National Institutes of Health. Jeremy
Rifkin, President of the Foundation, is a prolific author, 7 citizen-
advocate, and a leading speaker on the genetic engineering contro-
versy. Rifkin advocates halting all genetic engineering because he
believes that progress in the technology will result in desanctifica-
tion of human life and a collapse of social values.98
Rifkin sees the development of biotechnology initiating a revolu-
tion, much as the introduction of petrochemicals brought about
the industrial revolution. "Pointing to the negative externalities in
the petrochemical-based economy-acid rain, economic dislocation
due to market pressures and the destruction of environments in
the search for fuel and feedstock-he asks that society choose to
reject still another disruptive, possibly destructive technical
revolution." 99
95. Letter from Advanced Genetics Sciences, Inc., supra note 82, at 9.
96. David, supra note 6. The oriental kudzu plant was introduced into southern states
by railroad companies as a cover for embankments. The plant has outcompeted natural flora
and is now known as kudzu weed. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 19.
97. T. HOWARD & J. RIFKIN, WHO SHOULD PLAY GOD? (1977); J. RIFKIN, ALGENY (1983).
98. Interview with Jeremy Rifkin, President of the Foundation on Economic Trends, in
Washington, D.C. (July 2, 1984).
99. Jeremy Rifkin and the Courts: Last Line of Containment for Recombinant DNA,
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Margaret Heckler was being sued in her official capacity as Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services. In this capacity she is ulti-
mately responsible for the administration of all activities of the
NIH. The NIH has been the de facto regulator of all research in-
volving recombinant DNA technology °00 and has assumed the role
of regulator of all deliberate release experiments.
The NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee is the only
federal body with expertise and experience in recombinant DNA
technology regulation."' The committee feels that if it did not ex-
pand its role to cover deliberate release experiments, the pressures
of commercial competition would push biotechnology companies
into proceeding with deliberate release without the benefit of any
regulatory oversight. 0 2
The suit is an attack on the regulatory authority of the Director
of the NIH and the RAC for permitting deliberate release into the
environment of organisms genetically modified through recombi-
nant DNA techniques." 3 The Foundation on Economic Trends
raised procedural challenges to the manner in which the Director
of NIH permitted the authorizations of the deliberate release ex-
periments to occur. The Foundation argued that revising the NIH
Guidelines to permit authorization of deliberate release experi-
ments and authorizing three such experiments constituted a "ma-
jor federal action."10 4 It felt that failure to precede a major federal
action with a documented "hard look" at the environmental impli-
cations of that action constituted a violation of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196905 was enacted
by Congress to insure that the federal government would not un-
dertake any major programs or actions without first considering
the potential environmental consequences. The Act places an af-
firmative obligation on a federal agency to address potential envi-
ronmental hazards in a forum open to the public before it embarks
GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, July 6, 1984, at 6, col. 1; see also Davis, Science, Fanaticism,
and the Law, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, July 6, 1984, at 4, col. 1; Marshall, The Prophet
Jeremy, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 20, 1984, at 20.
100. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.
101. Id.
102. Interview with Dr. Stanley Barban, Administrative Scientist of the Office of Recom-
binant DNA Activities, in Washington, D.C. (July 3, 1984).
103. Interview with E. Lee Rogers, supra note 94.
104. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler,
No. 83-2714 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 1983).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
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on any particular course of conduct significantly affecting the envi-
ronment. The Act requires that an agency compile an environmen-
tal impact statement prior to final approval of all "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" or an Environmental Assessment showing a finding of no
major potential environmental hazard. 06
When the NIH Guidelines were originally published in 1976 they
contained a strict prohibition on deliberate release of recombinant
DNA molecule containing organisms into the environment. 10 7 The
NIH drafted an environmental impact statement in September
1976108 and adopted a final environmental impact statement for
the NIH Guidelines in October of 1977.V 0 Because the original
Guidelines strictly prohibited the release of recombinant DNA
containing organisms into the environment, the 1977 environmen-
tal impact statement did not address deliberate release
experiments.
When proposing the revisions to the Guidelines, the Director
stated that in the revised Guidelines "the prohibition of deliberate
release into the environment of recombinant DNA containing orga-
nisms can be waived only if all the requirements . . . of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. . . are met." ' The revised NIH
Guidelines of 1978 list the authorizing of individual waivers by the
Director of NIH as a "major action." '' The Environmental Assess-
ment accompanying the 1978 revision of the Guidelines also char-
acterized the modification permitting waiver of the prohibition of
deliberate release experiments by the Director of NIH as a "major"
revision."'
The National Environmental Policy Act requires that an agency
evaluate its action at the point of commitment. 13 The Director of
NIH argued that although it was impossible to assess with cer-
tainty the impact of a deliberate release experiment prior to its
initiation, the review he had given the experiment indicated that it
106. Id. § 4332(2)(c).
107. NIH Guidelines, § III-A-iv, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,914-15 (1976).
108. 41 Fed. Reg. 38,425 (1976).
109. See National Institutes of Health Environmental Impact Statement on NIH Guide-
lines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules of June 23, 1976 (pts. 1 & 2)
(Oct. 1977).
110. NIH Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042, 33,110 (1978).
111. Id. at 60,126-27.
112. Id. at 33,096-107.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1984).
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posed no risk to the environment.11 Therefore, in his opinion, no
environmental impact statement was necessary at this time. The
plaintiffs argued that the NIH had embarked on a "program" of
deliberate release experiments and that an environmental impact
statement should have been prepared, if not at the point of the
1978 revision of the Guidelines introducing the waiver provision,
then at least prior to the 1983 authorizations of the three direct
release experiments. 1 5
The 1978 revisions were, in fact, accompanied by two documents
entitled Environmental Assessments: one for the revisions as pro-
posed 6 and one for the revisions as adopted. 1 7 The second docu-
ment concluded that the revisions to the NIH Guidelines
presented "no adverse impact upon the environment." Although
Judge Sirica admitted the court lacked the competence to rule on
technical questions or on the effect of the recombinant organisms
on the environment,1 he stated that "the dispute would revolve
around the Director's conclusion that the change had no significant
impact on the environment." 1 9
Judge Sirica stated that he could find nothing in the record to
show that the Director of NIH had evaluated any specific deliber-
ate release experiments or any generic environmental issues which
could be common to all recombinant DNA experiments. Judge Sir-
ica felt that the Director, who only two years before had strictly
prohibited direct release experiments for fear of endangering the
environment, was not now in a position to declare that deliberate
release experiments would pose "no significant impact on the
environment."
"[U]nless the court were to assume that all such experimenta-
tion would have no significant environmental impact, the adminis-
trative record strongly indicates that plaintiffs will succeed in dem-
onstrating"' ° that the Director "approved a major Federal action
114. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 87, at 13, 28.
115. Id. at 7.
116. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,096 (1978).
117. Id. at 60,101.
118. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 87, at 2, 21; see also Diamond,
Comm'r of Patents & Trademarks v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Supreme Court
has had no exposure to biotechnology cases since Diamond, and has no biotechnology cases
pending. Conversation with Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court,
Tallahassee, Florida (Jan. 25, 1985). For a discussion of the possible utility of a court com-
posed of scientist-judges, see Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058
(1977).
119. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 87, at 18.
120. Id.
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without benefit of a specific or general investigation into the envi-
ronmental hazards of deliberate release experimentation."1"1
Sirica found the plaintiffs had a substantial chance of success on
the narrow legal issue of whether the Director of NIH should have
prepared an environmental impact statement. Further, finding the
prerequisites for a preliminary injunction to be satisfied, Judge
Sirica granted the injunction requested by the plaintiffs. He en-
joined the NIH from "[a]pproving or continuing to approve experi-
mentation involving the deliberate release of recombinant DNA
. . until such time as the Court enters final judgment on the mer-
its" and further enjoined the Regents of the University of Califor-
nia "from proceeding with the deliberate release experiment ap-
proved by NIH.' 1, 22
Judge Sirica also found that, as the NIH has no regulatory au-
thority over non-NIH-funded deliberate release experiments, he
could not order the NIH to cease reviewing those experiments. 23
There is currently no legal prohibition against any kind of recom-
binant DNA experiments conducted by the private sector. Follow-
ing the legal entanglement of the Lindow experiment in the federal
courts, Advanced Genetics Sciences, Inc., petitioned the RAC for
approval to conduct experiments similar to Lindow's.12' Advanced
Genetics Sciences is the commercial sponsor of Lindow's research
on biological control of frost damage. The experiments proposed
by Advanced Genetics Sciences would involve the deliberate re-
lease of the very organism created by Lindow. The proposed exper-
iments differed only in the types of plants which were to be ex-
posed. 126  The RAC reviewed the petition and recommended
approval to the Director of NIH. The Director usually accepts the
recommendation of the committee, but has not yet had time to act
on this recommendation.126
121. Id.
122. Id. at 38.
123. Id. at 31.
124. Letter from Advanced Genetics Sciences, Inc., supra note 82; see also 49 Fed. Reg.
17,672, 17,674-75 (1984).
125. Letter from Advanced Genetics Sciences, Inc., supra note 82.
126. Three non-NIH-funded corporations, BioTechnica International, Inc., Cetus
Madison Corp., and Advanced Genetics Sciences, Inc., have voluntarily petitioned the NIH
for approval to conduct deliberate release experiments. Interview with Dr. Stanley Barban,
supra note 6. Biotechnology companies, impatient with the delays, are considering con-
ducting tests out of the country or bypassing NIH and asking the EPA for permission to
conduct deliberate release experiments. Sun, Biotechnology's Regulatory Tangle, 225 Sci-
ENcE 697, 698 (1984). Monsanto plans to ask the EPA for permission to conduct field trials
in 1986 of a newly developed bacteria soil pesticide. Monsanto scientists transplanted the
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VII. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT: THE NIH, THE EPA, OR... ?
The NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee was estab-
lished in 1976 to oversee and insure the safety of NIH-funded re-
search where recombinant techniques are used. As the NIH was
tasked with finding cures for diseases, much of the recombinant
work being funded at the time involved infectious pathogens. The
RAC was initially composed of geneticists and physicians to pro-
vide expertise in the health safety aspects of these experiments. As
the recombinant DNA technology grew in pace, breadth, and com-
plexity, the RAC displayed an amazing ability to modify or aug-
ment its membership to provide expertise in each new area. The
RAC currently has members and consultants from a wide variety
of sciences and governmental agencies,127 reflecting the universal
applicability of recombinant DNA technology.
The extremely rapid transition from laboratory techniques to
applied commercial technology has attested to the efficient inter-
face by the RAC between the scientists and the government. The
long safety record with recombinant DNA technology demon-
strates the responsible representation of the public interest.'28 De-
spite the commendable record of public service the RAC has ac-
quired, the RAC has been receiving increasing criticism for their
move to expand their role to oversee direct release experiments.129
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research recom-
mended the creation of a new RAC "broadly based and not domi-
nated by geneticists or other scientists." "It would also be desira-
ble for this 'next generation' RAC to be independent of Federal
funding bodies such as the NIH, which is the major Federal spon-
sor of gene splicing research, to avoid any real or perceived conflict
of interest."1 30 Dr. Elena Nightingale, while a member of the RAC,
''suggested the NIH might not be the best location for an oversight
toxin producing gene from an airborne microbial pesticide into a common soil bacteria and
hope to use it to protect seeds against pests in the soil. Ellis & Rhein, A Test for One of
Biotech's New Watchdogs, Bus. WK., Jan. 14, 1985, at 69.
127. Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, NIH, Interoffice RAC Membership List of
June 1984. Responding to environmental concerns, the RAC has recently appointed two
ecologists-Dr. Sharples and Dr. Parone. Letter from Dr. Stanley Barban, Administrative
Scientist of the Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, to author (Nov. 15, 1984).
128. Johnson, Role of the Recombinant Advisory Committee, 224 SCIENCE 243 (1984).
129. Budia, Rifkin wins interim injunction, 309 NATURE 296 (1984); David, supra note 6;
Fox, Despite Doubts RAC Moving To Widen Role, 223 SCIENCE 798 (1984); Norman, supra
note 7; Sun, Biotechnology's Regulatory Tangle, 225 SCIENCE 697 (1984).
130. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 5, at 4.
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committee; the NIH funds and advocates scientific research. 13 1
The RAC recently screened two ecologists for consideration as
members: Martin Alexander of Cornell University and Frances
Sharples of Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Neither ecologist is
satisfied with the RAC as regulatory authority for direct release
experiments. Alexander feels that in areas affecting the ecology,
other agencies with "more competence, interest, and regulatory
clout"'132 should replace the NIH. Sharples agrees, but adds that
the "EPA is not prepared to take on the task at the moment.' '133
In February of 1984, the House Committee on Science and Tech-
nology (Don Fuqua, Florida, Chairman) released a congressional
report entitled The Environmental Implications of Genetic Engi-
neering.134 The report found that the damage that could occur as a
result of release into the environment of genetically engineered or-
ganisms is great.' 35 The report further found that predicting the
environmental effects of any novel organism prior to its release
into the environment would be "extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, at the present time."'3 6 The report concluded that "[t]he cur-
rent regulatory framework does not guarantee that adequate con-
sideration will be given to potential environmental effects of a
deliberate release.' 37
The report recommended, inter alia, that:
The EPA should proceed with its stated intention to extend its
authority to include all deliberately released organisms not specif-
ically identified as part of the legal obligation of another
agency ...
Until such time as EPA's regulations are promulgated, an inter-
agency task force should be established to review all proposals for
deliberate releases....
The NIH should cease its practice of evaluating and approving
proposals for deliberate releases from commercial biotechnology
companies. 138
The committee found that no single governmental body cur-
131. Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting 8 (Apr. 11, 1983).
132. Fox, supra note 129. But see supra note 127.
133. Fox, supra note 129.
134. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 11-12.
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rently possesses the interdisciplinary expertise necessary for evalu-
ation and regulation of deliberate release experiments. 139 The re-
port recommends that all organisms genetically engineered for
deliberate release, not just products of recombinant techniques, be
regulated under an interagency committee. Regulatory authority of
this agency should extend over all experiments, private and indus-
trial as well as federal. Such an agency had, in fact, been estab-
lished under President Ford in 1976. However, as a commentator
recently pointed out: "The Committee has been dormant for the
past two years because federal oversight has been accomplished by
the Recombinant Advisory Committee with federal agency repre-
sentatives serving as ex officio members of the RAC."'' 0
A cabinet level working group, headed by the White House Of-
fice of Science and Technology, is currently working on analyzing
existing law in terms of health and environmental protection, and
evaluating jurisdictional problems. The working group is debating
a larger role for the RAC. While a "super-RAC" may carry with it
the credibility and technical expertise of the RAC, a bureaucratic
expansion of the small and efficient current RAC may be tamper-
ing with a good thing.'4 ' The working group is looking favorably
upon a draft proposal, which is being worked on by the EPA, by
which the EPA will assume control over some aspects of direct re-
lease experiments.' 42
The EPA has, in fact, announced its intention to regulate envi-
ronmental releases under the authority of the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA).' 43 The TSCA regulates testing, manufacture,
and use of certain "chemical substances" that pose potential risks
to health or environment. Jurisdiction to regulate genetically engi-
neered life forms under TSCA hinges on the issue of whether life
forms can be classified as chemical substances under TSCA.' 44 The
EPA advances arguments that life forms fit under the statutory
language of TSCA because "the term 'chemical substance' means
139. NEPA demands an "interdisciplinary" inquiry. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1982);
40 C.F.R. § 1502.6 (1983).
140. Perpich, supra note 18, at 5, col. 3.
141. Sun, supra note 129, at 698.
142. Budiansky, Prospect of new US regulation, 310 NATURE 613 (1984).
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982). See Sun, EPA Revs Up To Regulate Biotechnology,
222 SCIENCE 823 (1983); Sun, supra note 129.
144. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 31-33. See also OFFICE OF PESTICIDES AND Toxic
SUBSTANCES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
SUBSTANCES UNDER TSCA (1983 draft), reprinted in STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, app. B, at
109-42.
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any organic or inorganic substance. . . , including-(i) any combi-
nation of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result
of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature .... 14' The EPA
admits that this interpretation might be subject to legal
challenge. 146
There are conceptual problems with the attempt to subjugate ge-
netically engineered life forms to the regulatory framework of
TSCA. The traditional "chemical substances" which TSCA was
designed to regulate cause problems only when human use concen-
trates the substances to levels of toxicity. While inert chemical
substances either stagnate or decompose in nature, genetically en-
gineered microbes are prolific breeders in favorable environmental
conditions. Inert toxins may be controlled by regulating human
use, but microbes are almost impossible to contain once released.
While inert toxins may be policed and cleaned up, microbes are
ubiquitous and no method has yet been devised to insure extermi-
nation of every last existing targeted undesired microbe. Chemicals
have easily quantifiable chemical properties, while living organisms
have complex behavorial properties. While a chemical is an end
product to be regulated under TSCA, living organisms may only be
"raw materials" whose effects and by-products are not felt until
they are permitted to fully interact with the ecosystem and assume
an environmental role or niche.
The EPA is also considering regulating genetically engineered
microbial pesticides (GEMP's) under the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 47
When a living organism is intended for use as a biological control
agent to prevent, repel, or destroy or mitigate a pest, or it is in-
tended for use as a plant growth regulator, defoliant or desiccant,
it is considered a pesticide under FIFRA, section 2(u), and is
therefore regulated under that Act.148
FIFRA is limited in scope; it covers only pesticides and categori-
cally exempts field trials on land of less than ten acres.149 While a
145. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1982).
146. Sun, supra note 129, at 698.
147. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (1982).
148. 40 C.F.R. § 162 (1984).
149. Id. § 172.3(a) (Experimental Use Permits) states:
A substance or mixture of substances being put through . . . field trials .. is
not considered a pesticide within the meaning of the Act and no experimental use
permit will be required. This purpose will be presumed for the following types of
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ten-acre exemption may be reasonable with respect to regulating
experiments involving inert chemicals, such an exemption would
eclipse the regulation when applied to living organisms which tend,
once released, to "go forth and multiply." EPA also exempts many
organisms on the grounds that they are already "adequately regu-
lated" by other federal agencies."' The Administrator of the EPA
may register a pesticide under FIFRA if he determines that:
It will perform its intended function without unreasonable ad-
verse effect on the environment; and . . . [w]hen used in accor-
dance with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will
not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment. . . . To permit this determination, the applicant for regis-
tration of a pesticide must provide data . . . so the Agency can
evaluate the potential hazards posed by its intended use(s).5
FIFRA requires the EPA to assess potential hazards of GEMP's
from data supplied by the applicant. The test protocol for data
submission establishes that certain representative animals and
plants be exposed to the GEMP's for a period of time after which
an assessment of GEMP survivability will be conducted. If the
GEMP's do not proliferate, no further risk assessments need be
undertaken. 152 This risk assessment procedure is inadequate in
that it not only invites biased data, but does not provide for detec-
tion of the spectrum of ecological effects which may be associated
with environmental release. The bacteria causing Dutch Elm Dis-
ease, for example, only cause damage in mature elm trees and
would have been assessed as environmentally safe under the ex-
isting procedure.
Neither the TSCA nor the FIFRA provides the EPA with a suffi-
ciently encompassing jurisdictional base upon which to establish a
regulatory framework for the oversight of direct release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms. Similar shortcomings plague the re-
maining existing federal acts: the Plant Quarantine Act gives con-
trol over only the importation or interstate movement of disease-
tests.
(1) Land use. Tests conducted on a cumulative of not more than 10 acres ....
150. 47 Fed. Reg. 23,928 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 162.5(c) (1982).
151. 47 Fed. Reg. 53,192, 53,200 (1982) (Pesticide Registration; Proposed Data Require-
ments-Part 158) (emphasis added).
152. Betz, Levin & Rogul, Safety Aspects of Genetically-Engineered Microbial Pesti-
cides, 6 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 135, 139 (1983).
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carrying plants, 153 the Plant Variety Protection Act does not grant
the USDA any power to prevent a release, 154 and the Federal Nox-
ious Weed Act and the Federal Plant Pest Act do not apply to the
production of the plants and micro-organisms they otherwise
regulate.' 55
A comparison of potential regulation of direct release under NIH
Guidelines with EPA's regulatory reach under FIFRA demon-
strates their respective strengths and weaknesses. Direct release is
perhaps more an environmental concern than a recombinant DNA
issue, and the EPA has more experience than NIH in predicting
environmental impact. While the regulatory authority of the NIH
under the Guidelines is limited to NIH-funded recombinant DNA
experiments, the EPA under FIFRA could regulate all GEMP's re-
gardless of mutagenic technique or funding source.
These differences are directly applicable to the Lindow experi-
ment which was enjoined in Heckler. The injunction was possible
because Lindow desired to use recombinant DNA techniques for
production of a more commercially suitable mutant, and because
his research happened to have been conducted at a university
which received support from the NIH. Had Lindow decided to
commercialize the INA mutant he had created through classical
mutagenic techniques there would have been no RAC review, no
court case, and no legal prohibition. As it was, the recombinant
DNA containing bacteria whose use was enjoined by Judge Sirica
was removed from the jurisdiction of the court and the NIH as a
result of Advanced Genetics Systems' decision to fund the deliber-
ate release experiment itself. While Advanced Genetics Systems is
not subject to NIH oversight, it is subject to regulation by the
EPA. However, current data submission requirements under
FIFRA might not have provided sufficient basis for the EPA to
assess the bacteria as harmful to the environment.
The congressional report recommends that "[n]o deliberate re-
lease should be permitted by EPA, NIH, USDA, or any other fed-
eral agency until the potential environmental effects of the partic-
ular release have been considered by the [proposed] interagency
review panel."' 56 The report also points out a technical problem:
"[P]redicting the specific type, magnitude, or probability of envi-
153. 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1982); STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 35-36.
154. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1982); STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 36-37.
155. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2813 (1982); id. §§ 150(aa)-(jj); STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at
37-41.
156. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 11.
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ronmental effects associated with the deliberate release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms will be extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, at the present time."15 It will be necessary to devise a
system for recognition of characteristics of novel organisms which
are indicators of potential environmental impact before it will be-
come possible to responsibly regulate deliberate release.158 The
EPA is building on the experience acquired by regulating
nongenetically engineered microbial pesticides and is developing
standard data requirements and hazard assessment procedures.'59
In regulating deliberate releases of genetically engineered orga-
nisms many conflicting interests must be addressed. Environmen-
talists would have all direct release experiments made public under
the Freedom of Information Act to permit public participation in
the decision-making process prior to any experiment. Biotechnol-
ogy companies rely on the Trade Secrets Act to protect commer-
cially valuable proprietary information from mandatory public dis-
closure. The Toxic Substances Control Act, for example, prohibits
the EPA from disclosing trade secrets otherwise exempt from the
disclosure under section 52(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information
Act. The government has an interest in keeping the edge in bio-
technology development, and the revenues from international pat-
ent licensing royalties in the United States.'0 0 Congress must rec-
oncile these diverse interests and act to establish and empower a
competent and unencumbered regulatory authority.
VIII. SUMMARY
The NIH is currently the de facto regulator of all work involving
recombinant DNA. The Guidelines under which the NIH regulates
the technology were originally established to insure that dangerous
organisms created during NIH-funded recombinant DNA experi-
ments would not be accidentally released into the environment. As
scientists discovered the inherent safety of recombinant techniques
the NIH relaxed the Guidelines to the point where today ninety
percent of proposed recombinant DNA experiments are categori-
cally exempt from prior RAC review.
Recombinant DNA techniques are the primary methods em-
ployed in the engineering of new commercially valuable organisms
157. Id. at 10.
158. Sun, supra note 129, at 698.
159. Betz, Levin & Rogul, supra note 152, at 141.
160. Sun, supra note 129, at 697.
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intended for release into the environment.161 The NIH has taken
the initiative to establish itself as the regulatory authority for ex-
periments involving deliberate environmental release of these orga-
nisms. The obvious reason for this development is that the NIH is
the only federal regulatory authority familiar with recombinant
DNA technology, and, in the absence of NIH's assumption of fed-
eral oversight, this emerging field would simply go unregulated. A
less obvious reason may be that scientists and biotechnology com-
panies, who prefer the liberal voluntary review standards of the
NIH to the stricter mandatory standards of the EPA under TSCA
or FIFRA, may have been exerting political pressure to keep the
NIH as the decision-making body for deliberate release
experiments.
Compliance with the NIH Guidelines is voluntary for non-NIH-
funded recombinant DNA experiments, and the Guidelines cover
only those organisms modified by recombinant DNA techniques.
Under FIFRA, the EPA has a broader legal basis for asserting con-
trol over deliberate release: all genetically engineered microbial
pesticides would be covered regardless of mutagenic technique or
funding source used in their production. The EPA, however, is not
yet ready to regulate deliberate release experiments. It does not
have a method of risk assessment for predicting the effects of an
exotic new organism on the ecosystem, and the FIFRA under
which the EPA intends to regulate GEMP's currently categorically
exempts all environmental releases covering less than ten acres.
The NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee is receiving
criticism for having assumed the role of regulator of direct release
experiments under guidelines which are oriented towards preven-
tion of accidental release and not towards oversight of deliberate
release. In Heckler, Judge Sirica ordered the NIH to cease review-
ing NIH-funded deliberate release experiments until the NIH com-
plied with the National Environmental Policy Act but permitted
the NIH to continue reviewing non-NIH-funded experiments. A
congressional report on the environmental implications of genetic
engineering found that the RAC did not possess the interdiscipli-
nary expertise or jurisdiction to regulate deliberate release experi-
ments. The report recommended that the NIH regulate only NIH-
funded experiments, which is exactly what the injunction issued by
Judge Sirica prevents it from doing.
The congressional staff report recommended that the EPA ex-
161. STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 30 n.44.
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pand its base of expertise to regulate deliberate release experi-
ments. A look at Lindow's experiment demonstrates that the envi-
ronmental aspects of his experiment eclipse the recombinant DNA
aspects. The RAC, by its own admission, considers recombinant
DNA techniques inherently safe and ready for deregulation. Be-
cause the primary danger of deliberate release experiments is the
potential unintended ecological harm, it is only appropriate that
the agency with the most experience in forecasting ecological im-
pact be tasked with their oversight.
The final decision of the federal district court in Heckler may
have significant policy impact, but it will have little actual impact
on deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms. If the
court follows the recommendation of the congressional staff report
and permits the NIH to continue to review NIH-funded deliberate
release experiments, there will be little pressure to correct the reg-
ulatory deficiencies. The court has, however, strongly indicated
that it will find for the plaintiff on the narrow legal question of
whether the NIH should be required to prepare an environmental
impact statement in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act before it may authorize deliberate release experiments.
Under this ruling the RAC may again review NIH-funded research
when the Director of NIH completes an envirohimental impact
statement. The Director expects an environmental impact state-
ment to be completed by late 1985. In the meantime all deliberate
release experiments will simply be funded by the corporate spon-
sors of the academic researchers and thereby be exempt from the
injunction.
The congressional staff report stated: "In view of EPA's stated
conclusion that the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) does
provide it with authority to oversee deliberate releases .. . , no
additional legislation or clarifying amendments are needed at this
time."' 62 A close look at the legal bases upon which the EPA pre-
mised its assertion, however, reveals significant inadequacies in
regulatory jurisdiction.
IX. CONCLUSION
Progress involves risk. Federal regulatory agencies provide risk
assessment and enforce risk management policies to insure that
the benefits of scientific advances are not outweighed by the dan-
162. Id. at 43.
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gers of blind commercialization. As the Lindow experiment wends
its way through the courts, it tests for the first time the adequacy
of federal regulatory mechanisms in the field of genetic engineer-
ing. Powerful scientific breakthroughs are raising such novel and
complex questions that prescriptive regulation is all but impossible
within the existing regulatory framework.
The Reagan Administration is reluctant to impose any new regu-
lations which may risk compromising the United States' lead in
this promising new technology.16 Federal regulatory agencies, at-
tempting to establish control over the new technology through in-
applicable and inadequate existing laws, are creating a patchwork
of conflicting regulatory policies."'
While federal regulatory mechanisms are currently deficient, it
would be premature to call for comprehensive regulation at this
time. As the Lindow experiment demonstrates, the environmental
risks associated with direct release experiments are due not to the
fact that the experimental organisms are genetically engineered,
but rather to the fact that the organisms are exotic to the environ-
ment. Scientists do not yet have the ability to predict how a novel
organism will interact with a given ecosystem. It is therefore im-
possible to regulate environmental releases within the constraints
of current scientific understanding.
To permit development of risk assessment protocols, it is neces-
sary at this time to proceed with carefully selected and closely
monitored deliberate release experiments. Data from these experi-
ments can be used to develop uniform guidelines for the review of
proposals for future direct release experiments. While it may never
be possible to predict with complete certainty the risk of ecological
harm harbored within each new genetically engineered organism, it
is the function of federal oversight to insure that the risks associ-
ated with scientific progress are minimized.
163. Rhein, Splicing Together a Regulatory Body for Biotechnology, Bus. WK., Jan. 14,
1985, at 69.
164. For TSCA to apply, life forms must fit the definition of "chemicals." FIFRA ex-
empts environmental releases of less than ten acres. Compliance with the NIH Guidelines is
voluntary for industry.
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